

Box 30
File 7
Doc 1SECRET

C. Berk

IGR 1967

- 1 4/25/67 Memorandum - re: plans to assass. Castro. Because of extreme sensitivity of operations, "as a matter of principle no official records were kept of planning, of approval, or of implementation."

W. Harvey retained skeletal notes of his activities during years in? - these are the best source of date

most info given has come orally

- 2 everyone deemed knowledgeable interviewed except Dulles and Cabell

"If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are more likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events."

- 3 5 separate phases in Agency assass. planning the transitions from one to another not always sharply defined. Each phase reflects the prevailing Gov. attitude to Cuban regime

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- a) prior to 8/60: all scheme identified except one intended to discredit Castro personally

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3 by influencing his behavior or altering his appearance

b) 8/60 - 4/61: ^{the plots} viewed by some ^{participants} as merely one aspect of overall active effort to overthrow Castro regime - culminated in Bay of Pigs

c) 4/61 - late/61: major scheme begun in 8/60 called off after Bay of Pigs - ~~was~~ dormant for several months as was most other operational activity related to Cuba

d) late/61 - late/62: scheme in c) reactivated in ~~late~~ early '62, pushed vigorously in era of Project MONSIEUR and in climate of intense admin. pressure on CIA to do something about CASTRO and his regime

e) late/62 until well into 1963: post-Cuba missile crisis 10/62 and collapse of Project MONSIEUR,

4 aggressive scheme begun in 8/60, renewed in 4/62, terminated in early '63.

2 other plots originated in 1963 but both deemed impracticable and did not come to fruition

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fruitless and unrealistic plots influenced by severe pressure from Kennedy Admin.

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2 points of importance:

1) eliminating a leader will not

5

2) Warnings about downfall of a govt require removal of leaders from positions of power - always a risk that participants will resort to assass.

necessitating cause downfall of govt re: internal CIA

draft paper of 10/61

initiated in response

to Gen'l M. Taylor

desire for contingency plan

A third point: frequent resort to synecdoches i.e. reference to a part when the whole is to be understood e.g. use of phrase disposing of CASTRO which read narrowly & literally means to assassinate him but which is intended to be read in broader, figurative sense of dislodging CASTRO regime.

Can also be read from other side of coin -

i.e. doing something about CASTRO meaning killing CASTRO

6

IFR concludes that no reason to believe that operators ^{were unduly influenced by} intelligence publications contents

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reference to D. P. SECRET 7/67 column re

16430

slot and use of prison pills by team

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ISK concludes that there is a base in
for for Pearson's reporting

a) CIA officer passed assassin weapon
to Agency Cuban asset at Paris
meeting on 11/22/63. The weapon was a
ball point pen rigged w/ hypodermic
syringe. Poison suggested for use was
Black Leaf 40.

7

b) Aug 10, 1962 meeting of SG (augmented)
at Dean Rusk's conference room. At
meeting Robert McNamara raised subject
of liquidation of Cuban leaders. As a
result Edward Tansdale prepared a
Project MONGOOSE action memorandum.

On 7/31/64 - another SG meeting -
discussed clandestine service info
report on Cuban exile plot to assassinate
CASTRO. CIA refused the request for
funds and has no involvement in the plot.

c) On 2 occasions, early '61, early '62
CIA supplied poison pills to crime
syndicate members to assassinate
CASTRO. '61 plot aborted, pills recovered
'62 plot pills passed to Cuban exile
leader in Fla., ita ~~see 111185~~ Cuba in
May 1962. June 1962 - exile leader
reported that ^{or crime syndicate} street man team dispatched
to CUBA to recruit for the operation.

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7. if oppy arose, the three men would attempt to kill CASTRO perhaps w/ the upell
8. Implication of D. Pearson story of direct, causative relationship among various plots is unfounded
9. Miscellaneous Schemes 7/60 to 8/60
March to August '60
3-4 schemes considered well - before B. of P.
Time frame is speculative - good guess is 1959 - 1961
J. D. (Jake) Esterline, head of Cuba task force pre-B. of P., - most reliable witness in gen'l timing - ^{concludes} all schemes under consideration while Esterline had direct respons. for CUBA operation
10. Esterline estimates March 1960 as time when planning would have progressed to consideration of means - by end of third quarter of '60, task force energies concentrated on "main - thrust effort" & thereafter no interest in pursuing other schemes

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no evidence that schemes approved at any high level other division SECRET ESR believes no higher-level approvals were sought because in scheme progressed to point where approval to launch needed

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10

Aerosol attack on Radio Station
(Ray Treichler), TSD, scheme discussed
to spray LSD like substance on radio
studio where CASTRO did broadcasts -
nothing came of idea - discouraged
because chemical was not really effective
(Henry ⁰³ Boland), TSD

11

resulted experiment w/ psychic energizers
but not related to CASTRO as a target

Contaminated Cigars

pre B. of Phys processing contain. Cigars
by Esterline. Cigars would produce
temporary personality disorientation.

Wanted to have CASTRO smoke one before speech
Might have been prepared by (Ray Treichler)
Esterline might have confused the chemical
agent in that cigar might have been
intended to make CASTRO's beard fall
out, Esterline positive cigars were
not lethal

12

Cigars not used because WH/4 couldn't
figure out how to safely deliver them
Esterline said he destroyed them before

he left ^{WH/4} ~~agency~~ in June 1961.

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Sidney Gottlieb of TSP believes cigars
were intended for stopping - but Gottlieb
believes ~~scheme~~ didn't get beyond talk

may
indicate
2 separate
schemes
didn't get
DD/P's approval
(and all)

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- 13 Depilatory
(R. [unclear]) recalls scheme to use depilatory to destroy CASTRO's image by making his beard fall out. Idea was to dust thallium powder (the depilatory) in CASTRO's shoes. Scheme got only so far as procurement of chemical and testing on animals. But scheme fell through because trip outside CUBA by CASTRO at which time powder was to be used fell thru.

14 Gambling Syndicate

2 phase operation

a) from 8/60 - 4/ or 5/61

b) from 4/62 - 2/63 (renewal of 1st phase)

Phase I

August 1960

DDP Bissel asked Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, if Edwards could establish contact w/ U.S. gambling syndicate active in CUBA - objective was to assassinate CASTRO. When Edwards said term was avoided in convers. w/ Bissel Bissel says idea originated w/ J.C. King, then Chief of WH Division.

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(1/11)

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15 Edwards contacted Robert Mahen.
Mahen had been an SA for FBI.
Mahen had provided in the past
support to CIA in some of its more
sensitive operation

CIA people in TOR report who worked for FBI
Mahen, ^{Robert} Cunningham, William Hawley, James
O'Connell, Edward Morgan

16 Mahen told Edwards he had contact to
U.S. crime syndicate. Mahen agreed to
participate only after being pressured by
Edwards. Mahen's interest was Johnny
Roselli. Edwards and Mahen agreed
Mahen would approach Roselli as
representative of businessmen w/ interests in
CUBA who needed CASTRO eliminated.
\$150,000 authorized to pay for CASTRO's removal

11111889
September 1960 - case officer for operation
was James P. O'Connell, Chief, Oper-
ational Support Division, Office of Security.
9/14/60 - O'Connell & Mahen meet
Roselli in NYC - Mahen makes the pitch
Roselli agrees & says will introduce Mahen
to "Sam Gold" who could arrange it & had
syndicate contacts in ~~SECRET~~

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17 Roselli declines payment, believed Dole would
Memo for Record prepared by Staff. Edwards
5/14/62: no money ever paid to Roselli
in Giancana. (Giancana "Gold")

CIA emp in office of Security
Only O'Connell was made witting of operation
at the time. Edwards didn't meet Roselli
till summer of '62

Bissell informed of contact w/ syndicate
by Edwards during ~~summer~~ late fall
of Sept 1960. only Bissell, Edwards,
& O'Connell ^{at CIA} knew of the plan. Edwards
stated that Helms was not informed
of the plan because Bissell was handling
CUBA at the time.

18 Edwards briefed Dulles and Cabell on
the syndicate plan. Bissell was
present at briefing. Edwards avoided
use of "bad words" - descriptive
term used was "an intelligence opera-
tion" but Edwards sure that Dulles and
Cabell knew what the nature of the operation
discussion was

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Edwards described the channel as A (Maken)
to B (Roselli) to C (the principle in CUBA)

No formal approval given - Edwards believes
he had ~~that approval~~ ^{SECRET} Bissell committed \$50,000
to support of operation

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week of 9/25/60 - O'Connell, Mathew
go to Miami where Mathew intro-
duced to Sam "Gold" at Fontainebleau
Hotel - "Gold" said he had a
man "Joe" (Santo Trafficante) who
would be courier to CUBA and make
arrangements there

O'Connell never met "Gold" or "Joe"

O'Connell learned their true identities
after ^{several weeks later} from Parade Magazine supplement

see office of Security Memo to DDCI 6/24/6

At time, Miami meeting Trafficante was
making regular trips between Miami
and Havana on syndicate business

20

"Trafficante was to make the arrange-
ments (for CASTRO's assets) with one of
his contacts inside CUBA on one of his
trips to Havana."

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Fall and Winter 1960

Plan to first contact w/ Roselli, machinery
for readying assets was set in motion

21

Not unusual for Chief of TSD to be by-pass
in operations involving his people. Such practices
and procedures may account for differing recollection
of what did happen SECRET significance

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- 21 ⁰³ (Reichle) recalls treating a full box
of cigars w/ bacterial toxin - similar poison
which is fatal a few hours after ingestion
- 22 ⁰³ (Reichle) kept one of the experimental cigars
Had it as of 1967.

Dr. Edward Heenan got the cigars and
kept them in his safe - destroyed
them w/in a month of Chef Edwards retirement
in June 1963

- 23 Roosevelt, Chief of TSD remembers
speaking to ~~B~~ Chef Edwards after
Bissell discussed it w/ Edwards
Roosevelt recalls 4 possible approaches;
a) something highly toxic e.g. shellfish
poison administered by a pin
b) bacterial material in liquid form
c) bacterial treatment of cigar or cigarette
d) handkerchief treated w/ bacteria
Bissell and Roosevelt both recall that
decision was for bacteria in liquid form

- 24 January - February 1961 11111892
Solid in form of pills (size of saccharine
tablets) was actually prepared and delivered
Pill form chosen because of ease and safety of
handling

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25 Gurneave against use of firearms -
would have been a suicide mission -
he preferred a lethal pill. Inside
man for ~~the~~ syndicate was Juan Ortiz,
off Chief ~~of~~ & Director General of the Office
of the Prime Minister (CASTRO) - Ortiz needed
money

2/6/61 - ^{recd} conversation between Gurn and
(~~Heichle~~) - Gurn had tested pills on
Guinea pigs & found them to be ineffective
& G.P.'s have high resistance to vomiting

26 when tested on monkeys the pills worked
O'Connell eventually received the pills.
He recalls dealing w/ (~~Heichle~~) but
(~~Heichle~~) has no record of delivering
pills but he doesn't ordinarily keep
detailed records of such things

27 O'Connell believes there were 6 pills - gave 3 of
them to Roselle - passed sometime
after 2/10/61

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Gurn was approached about the
operation by William Harvey in Feb 61
Harvey was briefed on the operation

J.C. King also briefed ^{then} although King
denies learning of the operation till much later

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3/
Mr

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Late Feb - March 1961

27

Roselli passed pills to Trafficante
Roselli told O'Connell that pills
delivered to Orta in Cuba

Orta kept pills for couple weeks
and then returned them - syndicate

28

said he got cold feet. By the time Orta
had lost his position in the Prime Minister's
office

"It seems likely that, while the
Agency thought the gangsters had
a man in Cuba with easy access
to Castro, what they actually had
was a man disgruntled at
having lost access"

29

Orta suggested replacement who made
several unsuccessful attempts. Neither
Edwards nor O'Connell know who the was

March - April 1961

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Roselli tells O'Connell the Trafficante
knows man in Cuban Exile movement
who might do the job - Tony Varona
(Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona y Loreda)
Varona headed Democratic Revolutionary
Front - agency supporter group

Varona was associated by 1/18/61 FBI report

~~11111894~~ w/ financial package to over-
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- 30 P.R. man for Varona was Edward K. Moss who had significant ties in Cuba thru his mistress' brothers (Celleni)
- 31 Trafficante approached Varona about killing CASTRO. Varona is receptive because its by money for ships, arms etc

Roselli
knows
O'Connell
is C.I.K. employee

- O'Connell informs Robert Bannerman, Edwards deputy of the operation. Bannerman was unhappy with the plan. Since Edwards out of town, Bannerman authorizes passing money (25 or 50 thou) to Varona. Office of Secy. mem to DDXI 6/24/66 des figure \$810,000 cash
- 32 ~~Roselli~~ O'Connell delivers money and pills to Roselli. Roselli gives money and pills to Varona. Little is known of the delivery channels beyond Varona.

April - May 1961

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- 33 Soon after Bay of Pigs Edwards sends word to Roselli thru O'Connell that the operation is off. O'Connell believes Standish was not firm and final and that something was going on between 4/61 and 4/62 but can't recall what. He agrees w/ Hawes that when Hawes took over in 4/62 it was a "going operation"

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34

O'Connell believes he recovered the pills and destroyed them

5/14/62 memo by S. Edwards state that 6 persons had knowledge of the operation but IOR identifies

13 people who knew in late '60 or in early '61 of ^{the} plan to assass. Castro

- 1) Allen Dulles
- 2) Gen. Cabell
- 3) Richard Bissell
- 4) Sheffield Edwards
- 5) James O'Connell
- 6) J. D. Esterline
- 7) Cornelius Roosevelt
- 8) ³(Ray Treichler)
- 9) Edward Gunn
- 10) William Hawley
- 11) Sidney Gottlieb
- 12) Robert Bannerman
- 13) J. C. King

35

4 persons outside got known to be writers of the operation and the Agency connection

- 1) Robert Maheu
- 2) John Roselli
- 3) Sam Giancana
- 4) Santos Trafficante

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- 35 often aware but whose knowledge of C, A Connection is speculative
- 1) Juan Orta
 - 2) Antonio Varona
 - 3) Varona's son-in-law

- 36 RFK and Lawrence Huston learned full details in May 1962 as for ^{see report} Drew Pearson's ~~article~~ ^{has} if it approximates the FGR then the following might be knowledgeable
- 1) Edward P. Morgan
 - 2) Drew Pearson & Jack Anderson
 - 3) Earl Warren
 - 4) James Rowley
 - 5) Pat Coyne
 - 6) Atty Gen'l Ramsey Clark
 - 7) Various members of the FBI

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- 37 Gambling Syndicate-Phase 2
- 4 Feb. 61 Bissell assigned sensitive ~~mission~~ operation to Harvey - referred to as Executive Action Capabilities - stands capabilities to carryout assassinations when required
- Bissell recalls discussing development of 1 capabilities - this is why Harvey was briefed by Edwards re gambling syndicate operation

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38 Bissell had discussed certain aspects quite problem w/ (Pinole Silver) and Sidney Gottlieb - Harvey uses (Silver) in developing Execution capabilities but not w/ respect to CASTRO.

Nelms was briefed ^{in Hawaii} on general concept of E. A but did not mention the then ongoing plot to assassinate Castro.

Exec Action - known as ZRRIFLE

Principal asset - QJWIN - ^{recruited for} use ⁱⁿ ⁰³ ~~Patrol~~ ~~summa~~ ~~2~~ - recruited by (Silver)

was to be run by Justice O'Donnell - (he asked to be released - didn't want part of it - Bissell granted the request)

ZRRIFLE - first appears in file in 5/61 - first recorded approval 2/19/62 on 2/19/62 - DPP Nelms authorized

39 Harvey, by memo, to handle project on special basis

QJWIN gets annual salary ¹¹¹¹¹⁸⁹⁸ of 7200 + 7500 for operational expenses cover for ZRRIFLE was ^{as} an FI/D operation

11/15/61 - Harvey discusses w/ Bissell use of ZRRIFLE program in CUBA -

Bissell told Harvey to take over ~~of~~ Edwards contract w/ syndicate and run the operation against CUBA. Nelms ^{SECRET} ~~afterwards~~ places HARVEY in charge of CUBA task force

(3/11)

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Late 1961 - Early 1962

39 Harvey busy ~~with~~ following discussion
w/ Biswell and the interview ^{Edward's} CASTRO
operation

40 Feb - March 1962

Harvey 1st meets w Edwards re CASTRO
operation in Feb 1962

Harvey ran Castro operation as one
aspect of ZRRIFLE - but Harvey personally
handled the Castro operation and
did not use any of the assets
developed in ZRRIFLE. Harvey
treated Exec. Action program as
synonymous w/ QT wld

Harvey said when he wrote ZRRIFLE/QTWIN
the reference was to Executive Action
Capability; when he used the cryptonym
ZRRIFLE alone, he was referring to
CASTRO. Harvey said his correspondence
would disclose the distinction. FGR
reviewed the correspondence & for
most part found it unrevealing

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41

QTWIN terminated by ~~Supernatural~~
~~Station~~ at 4/21/64. No indication
file that Exec Action Capability of ZRRIFLE/
QTWIN was ever used

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41

April 1962

Edwards w/ Helms approval arrange for Harvey to be put in touch w/ Roselli. Harvey briefed Helms prior to ^{first} meeting w/ Roselli in its purpose & reported to Helms results of meeting w/ Roselli.

Thereafter, Harvey states he regularly briefed Helms on status of CASTRO operation

April '62 - Edwards statement that the "verified Helms approval" is earliest indication of Helms willing on gambling syndicate operation

and that Helms approved that Harvey not brief the Director (McCona) on the meeting

42

Edwards believes that the operation was called off completely after Bay of Pigs and no further operational activity until Harvey met Roselli & reactivated the operation in 4/62

Harvey's recollection is supportive of Edwards except Harvey says he took over a going operation

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43 O'Connell also believes there was something going on between 4/61 after B Pigs and 4/62 but can't remember particulars

4/8 - 4/9 - Hawley & O'Connell in NYC to meet Roselli

44 Hawley & O'Connell dispute whether Mahan was present at meetings bears upon whether Mahan knew the operation continued under Hawley

45 ~~Mahan~~, Hawley, Roselli, O'Connell & maybe Mahan go to Copacabana see Phyllis McGuire there - Roselli attempts to avoid her

Edwards says that when he briefed Hawley on takeover he did not mention Mahan so that he could screen Mahan out of the operation

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46 O'Connell carryover into Phase II for purpose of continuity - appears to be a few weeks - his role in the operation ended by June 1962 when he was assigned PCS to (Okinawa)

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47 Harvey arrives in Miami on 4/21/62 - finds Roselli in truck w/ Tony Varona. Harvey recount to TSK how he took over a "going operation". O'Connell concurs.

48 Harvey didn't want Guercanna in reactivation of the operation - Harvey believes Roselli honored the request. Trafficante no longer involved. Roselli ~~know~~ had man known to Harvey as Maceo - also used name Garcia - Gomez and Godoy. Harvey describe Maceo as "a Cuban who spoke Italian". Roselli remained prominent in the operation but he worked directly w/ Cuban exile and directly on behalf of CIA.

not likely to be Antonio Maceo Mucke or associate of Varona because Mucke well-known w/ Cuban exile and Harvey would have had knowledge of him

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49 "...It would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing high-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate."

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After Pills given by Roselli to Varona, Varona requested arms and equipment for support of his operation. Harwey was ~~also~~ informed, the by Roselli. Harwey and JMWAVE station chief Ted Shackley procured the materials at cost of \$85000 was T/Aid to Headquarters

Harwey + Shackley loaded equip into a U-Haul and parked it in parking lot at a drive-in restaurants. Roselli given the car keys

50

Delivery to Maceo, Varona, or Varona's son-in-law. Harwey + Roselli did not trust each other yet. Each wore a double-cross. ~~The~~ Each party surveilled the other (O'Connell was w/Roselli, Shackley w/Harwey - The truck was picked up + returned empty w/ keys under the seat as prearranged. Harwey says Shackley never knew to whom delivery was made or for what purpose - he really was called upon to furnish support for HQ operation from which he was otherwise excluded

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May 1962

Harvey and Roselli communicated telephonically by prearranged system
Roselli reported that pills in Cuba at restaurant where Castro eats regularly

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June 1962

June 21 - Roselli reports to Harvey that Varona has dispatched 3 man team into Cuba; Harvey says 3 men have no specific plan for killing Castro. The 3 men would recruit others to kill C. If ops presented they would kill C, maybe using pills
Harvey never knew their names

Sept 1962

Harvey and Roselli meet in Miami on 9/7 & 9/11
"Medusa" reported in place, 3 man team safe
& Varona ready to send another 3 man team to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard

52

Sept 1962 - Jan '63

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3 man team doesn't leave - Oct missile crisis develops, Between 12/22 & 1/6/63
Harvey sees Roselli & Maces in Miami
Pays Roselli \$2700 for Varona for 3rd man team expense. Harvey & Roselli talk by phone 1/11 - 1/16
Roselli & Harvey agree SECRET for much happening now
& future

Feb 63

Hawey in Miami 2/11 - 2/14 leaves word
for Marco that it looks like it all
over. 2/15 - Hawey leaves Miami for
L. A. to meet Roselli. At L. A. meeting
Hawey & Roselli agree to close off the operation
but that Roselli would continue to see Garma,
gradually reducing frequency until no contact

53 April - May 1963

Harvey says gets 2 phone calls from Roselli
Harvey wants one last meeting - / Roselli before
Harvey leaves for Rome. Helms informed of such
by Harvey. Helms gives approval.

June 1963

Roselli in Wash. mid-June to meet w/ Harvey
Sam Papich calls Harvey while Harvey & Roselli
are dining out who asks Harvey if he knows
his dinner guest identity. Harvey says he does

4 1111905

Harvey meets Papuk next morning. Explains that he is terminating an operational association w/ Fuselli. Papuk says he must report this to J. Edgar Hoover. Harvey does not object. Harvey ^{said he} asked Papuk to inform him in advance if it appeared that Hoover might call Mc Cone - because Mc Cone should be ~~be briefed~~ ^{briefed} before receiving Hoover's call, Papuk agrees.

because the cone should be developed before reviewers
Hovler's call, Pappas agrees.

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Harvey says he then told Helms of the incident & Helms agreed that there was no need to brief McConne unless Hoover's call is to be expected.

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This was Harvey's last face-to-face meeting w/ Roselli

2nd phase writers persons

Richard Helms

William Harvey

James O'Connell

Sheffield Edwards

J. C. King

(Bruce Cheever)

Ted Shackley

(Ray Treichler)

Antonio Varona

Varona's son-in-law

Marco, Roselli's "man"

56

San Juan may have been informed 2nd phase by Roselli, ditto Santo Trafficante
O'Connell believes Maken knew,

Possible leaks:

Roselli to Maken

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Maken to Edward P. Morgan (Maken's Wash. lawyer)

Morgan to D. Pearson

Pearson to Chief Justice President

Warren to Rowley (chief of Sec. Service)

Rowley to J. Edgar Hoover & the FBI, the FBI to Atty Gen. Clark

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The Wiretapping Incident

57

Late '61 - Early '62

Garcara's private life ^{caused} incident that made FBI aware of Agency's relationship w/syndicate - requested briefings of A.C. on details of assassination plot

Phyllis McGuire - Garcara's mistress
Garcara thought she was having affair w/Dan Rowan - Garcara wanted McGuire's Las Vegas hotel room bugged. Maken, reluctantly agreed to bug room for Garcara

58

Date of incident is uncertain - could have been 1961 - after Bay of Pigs, maybe early 1962 but before 2/7/62 on which date Director of Security told FBI that CIA would object to prosecution

Edward L. DuBois handles request for Maken. DuBois assigns Arthur J. Bulletti & J.W. Harrison to do the job

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59

O'Connell says telephone tap used instead of planting bug in the room. Bulletti & Harrison found by the maid + local sheriff called in. Bulletti arrested Harrison in Room 111 called Maken in presence of state attorney

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59 Thus, case reaches the FBI, ~~FBI~~ FBI
wanted to press for prosecution under
wiretapping statute. Maken on being
approached by FBI referred then to
60 ^{Edward says} Shep Edwards at CIA. Maken told
FBI that the tap was for an operation
working on for Edwards. FBI memo
of 3/23/62 indicates that FBI ^{now} knew
of ~~the~~ Cuban intelligence information
operation and believed wiring of
Rowan's room done for this purpose -
but doesn't indicate FBI knew it ~~was~~
~~was~~ the intelligence operation was
assass. plot

March 1962

The memo of 3/23 confirms 2/7
meetings between Edwards and FBI rep.
2/7 meeting - Edwards says Maken involved
in sensitive operation w/ agency - agency
objects to prosecution

61 3/28 or 3/29 Edwards and FBI ¹¹¹¹¹⁹⁶⁸ liaison
Sam Papick meet. Edwards reiterates
his position re prosecution. Edwards
makes record of meetings in 4/4/62 memo.
Dulles and Bissell gone by the time, Helms
didn't know of the operation - Edwards dealt
w/ Papick w/out reference to anyone else at
CIA

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April 1962

4/16 - Lawrence Houston, CIA Gen'l Counsel meets w/ Herbert J. Miller of Justice Dept (Criminal Division) and indicates Agency involvement w/out revealing details of assass. operation. Houston makes memo 4/26 of meeting, indicates Miller will cooperate but might mention it to Atty Gen'l.

4/20 - Houston meets w/ Foley, Miller's asst - indicates that prosecution for other matters not related to bugger flap is OK. ~~Be~~

62a

Because A.G. might be informed, Houston briefs DDIC Gen'l Carter who said he might at some time brief McCone. Not known if Carter briefed McCone. No indication that Carter briefed further on full details of assass. operation.

May 1962

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A.G. informed because he requested briefing 5/7/62 - Houston and Edwards brief A.G. RFR "all the way" (Edwards words). A.G. indicates he would not prosecute on the ~~bugger flap~~ ^{SECRET}. A.G. said that he expected to be informed in future if so ~~business~~ w/ ag'd crime again.

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- 63 At A.G.'s request memorandum record of meeting prepared. Edwards & Houston both helped write it. RFK request on 5/11, memo dated 5/14. 2 copies ~~to~~ - original to RFK, other to Shief Edwards - Dir of Sec'y - true purpose of operation may be inferred from the memo. McConne, Edwards says was not briefed on Carter & Helms.
- 64 "From reports of the briefings, it is reasonable to assume that Kennedy believed he had such a commitment (to be told in advance of CIA involvement w/ US gangster elements) from Agency representatives. But at this very time that RFK briefed on Phase I, Phase II under Hawley was under way - as far as I know Kennedy was never told of Phase II.
- 65 5/14 - Hawley says he briefed Helms on meeting. Hawley advised against briefing ~~the~~ McConne & Carter & Helms concurred.
- 66 It appears that FBI was not given a briefing of operation in anything like the detail given to Kennedy.

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IGR characterizes Agency as
first unwitting and then
reluctant accessory after the fact
in the wiretapping flap

August 1963

Chicago Sun-Time article 8/16/63 -

"CIA sought Giancana help for Cuba
spies"

68

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8/20/63 Chicago Sun-Time article

8/16/63 - DDP Helms memo to McCona
forwarding a copy of 5/14/62 memo for
record to RFK following 5/7/62

briefing of RFK on phase I operation

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IGR - earliest date 8/16/63 - that
have evidence of McCona's awareness
of scheme to assassinate Castro using syndicate
IGR says it is not new knowledge that
CIA allied w/ gangsters to collect info -
what is new is that rumors connect
CIA + gangsters to ^{assassinate} plot re Castro

11111911

May - July 1966

- The Long Committee

71

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71

72 Maken worked for Mardos against
Orassis - Maken received support
thru State Dept request from CIA
in 1954 - 1955 period

73

Maken has been used over the years in a
number of sensitive CIA operations.
CIA didn't want him to testify before
Long Committee

74

Maken may have told his atty - Edward
P. Morgan the details of the plan to
assassinate CASTRO using gangster
CIA has interviewed 3 times ^{that} Maken ~~was~~ ^{has} scene
1 - Mardos
2 - Maken

Schems in Early 1963

75

SKIN DURING SCHEM

11111912

76

Sydney Gottlieb, Samuel Halperin,
William Hawey, + Fitzgerald knew
of it - maybe (Mike Muskovsky)
also Hawey says he mentioned it
to (George McManus) special asst
to DDP Helms - (McManus) told Halperin
that he mentioned it to Helms
Hawey denies any knowledge

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1/M

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7
77

Booby-Trapped Sen Stell

Dr Fitzgerald, Chief SAS

scheme deemed impracticable

Fitzgerald, Halpern, + ~~Bruce~~ ⁰³

Cheever knew of it. Halpern believes
he contacted TSD on this

ms

Tab A Source of Info

files furnished by:

- 1) Dir. of Security
- 2) Dep. Dir. for Support
- 3) Gen'l Counsel
- 4) Asst. Counsel
- 5) Chief of W. H. Division
- 6) Col F. L. King, former chief of
W H division

biographies files + intell. papers
furnished by Director of Central Reference

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List of those interviewed in Castro Assass Plot
Donald Fitzgerald, Samuel Halpern, ~~Bruce~~ ⁰³
~~Cheever~~, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez,
J. D. Esletire, Edward Gunn, Howard
Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney
Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard
Bissel, Laurence Houston, ~~Ray Neidley~~,
John Warner, Nativ Sanchez, William
Hawes, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman,
~~Neville Brune~~, ~~Robert Obe~~

03

24
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(Secado)

Project Amldash - Rolando Cubela

3/9/61 - (Jack Stewart), NYC Section

officer meets ⁰³Cubela to get his views on Cuba. Cubela non-committal meeting arranged by HADWHIP I, (Carlos Tepedino) - Cubela's friend

Cubela held rank of major in Cuban military - the highest rank

Project AMLAH grew out of initial meeting between (Stewart) and Cubela. The March 61 meeting ⁰³ was inconclusive. Cubela said that 1st step to overthrow regime is to eliminate CASTRO which Cubela would do. He requested repeatedly that CIA furnish him eqpt. to do the job

Nector Sanchez was Cubela's case officer. "The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubela's plotting."

3/28/61

11111914

Jim Onta & Cubela wanted to defect. CIA was for the exfiltration but called off because of report that Cuban police knew of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans

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It was known to CIA officers that Cubela was a gargantuan asset in Cuba handling syndicate operation

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81

8/14/61

Cubela sends message to (Nepedino) that he wants to talk to a "friend" of (Slevents)⁰³ in Paris if possible (Paris station) ok'd to approach Cubela but no indication from file that actually contacted

6/15/62

JMWAVE station cable-station asset (AMCONCERT) told by Lucia Echevarria Blanco that Cubela left for Helsinki on 6/10/62.

82

6/27/62

FBI forwards to CIA report of meeting w/ FBI informant on 6/11 in Miami. Informant states Cubela wants to defect. FBI informant was (Nepedino). Bureau informed of (Slevents)⁰³ meeting w/ Cubela

7/8/62

11111915

(Nepedino) talks to JMWAVE station officer. (Nepedino) verifies this info source re Cubela is the Echevarria. (Nepedino) discusses w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "planned defection" in Paris on 8/61

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83

7/13 - 14/62

(William Wainwright)⁰³ of HQ meets
(Depeding) in New York. (Depeding)
will assist Cubela's defection

~~87~~

7/30 - 8/6/62

(Depeding) in Helsinki on 7/30 -
Cubela meets w/ (Wainwright)
on 8/1 - first of a series of
meetings
original objective of defecting
Cubela changed to recruiting him
in place

84

(Wainwright)⁰³ note - Cubela also wanted
to assassinate Carlos Rodriguez (top-
ranking CASTRO subordinate) and the
Soviet Ambassador & also FIDEL,

by execution, if necessary

(Wainwright) said CIA could make no

⁰³ commitments or plans

Cubela states he would only involve himself
in a plan of significant action, and which
was designed to achieve rapidly. He de-
scribes to help Cuba

8/7 - 8/9/62

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further meetings agreed to in Stockholm
& Copenhagen - nothing signif.
in Stockholm meetings except that

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7
84

he had told among his Cuban associates
of his meetings in Habana w/ ~~(Pepe)~~

85

8/10 - 8/11/62

⁰³
~~(Wainwright)~~ ~~(Pepe)~~ + Cubela in
Copenhagen for further meetings
~~(Wainwright)~~ wrote that he used the
term ⁰³ assassinate in letter to
Cubela. Cubela found the term
objectionable (as reported by ~~(Pepe)~~)
The fact he did not object to but the
term)

" It is worth noting here that
~~(Pepe)~~, a Cuban jeweler in
New York, was present at a series
of meetings at which the assas-
sination of Castro was discussed
between ~~(Pepe)~~ and ~~(Wainwright)~~,
whom ~~(Pepe)~~ knew to be a CIA ⁰³
officer."

8/14 - 8/23/62

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⁰³
~~(Earl Williamson)~~, Spanish speaking
case officer (from Madrid) meets
Cubela, ~~(Pepe)~~, + ~~(Wainwright)~~ ⁰³ in
Paris. ~~(Williamson)~~ ⁰³ planned to polygraph
Cubela - Cubela refused
Cubela given S/W + demolition training

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7/1

⁰³
8/17/62 cable by ~~(Pepe)~~
recommending ~~(Pepe)~~ as a Cuban messenger but
only something in Cubela's own indication
of ~~(Pepe)~~ delirious not
to give Cubela any physical
elimination mission 8/18/62 cable

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86

8/29/62 - Cubela leaves Prague for Havana

9/5-9/8/63⁰³ - Cubela met in Brazil
(by Wainwright) Peperino, & Nelson Sanchez - thereafter Cubela's case
officer

Cubela reluctant to use S/W message,
because he feared efficiency of Cuban
Postal Censorship

Cubela wanted to approach Ramon Guin
Diaz (AMTRUNK-10) who was ⁰¹
hiding Miguel Diaz Osalque (AM(CE-14)
Diaz had recruiter⁰⁴ Guin for CIA & had
done so

Cubela told to assist Guin in his
intelligence assignment - Cubela
concerned about Guin's drinking and
"neurosis condition"

87

9/14/63

Cubela to Paris for extended vacation -
to inform Castro afterwards

9/10/63

Cubela write Peperino - ¹¹¹¹¹⁹¹⁸ he wants more
politics & doesn't want to be your friend
again

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10/3/63

87

~~10/10/63~~

Sanchez in Paris to see Cubela
also present were (John (Tex) Stent &
Richard Long. French were keeping
Cubela under surveillance. CIA informant
French that Cubela intended to defect (see)

10/14/63

88

Cubela cable wants to meet senior U.S. official
preferably RFK for assurance of U.S.
moral support for his activities in Cuba
Sanchez felt strongly that contact
should be made

10/13/63

(Paris cable re Sanchez's return
to HA via AMLAH)

10/17/63

Cubela meets w/ (Stent & Terpeding)
reiterate his desire for high-level U.S.
reassurance

89

10/29/63

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Des Fitzgerald, Chief SAs, arranges
to meet Cubela in Paris to give him the
assurances he sought. Fitzgerald,
according to AMLAH file represented
self as personal rep of RFK who
was in Paris specifically to give Cubela assurances
he wanted. Fitzgerald said he discussed plan
w/ DPP Helms who said ~~SECRET~~ need to have
approved by RFK

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7
89

meeting held on 10/29 ^{in Paris} at (Ker) Sten's house.
Fitzgerald used alias (James Clark).
(Nelson Sanchez) was the interpreter.
Sten not present at the meeting.
(Sanchez) made memo of meeting on 11/13/63.
"Fitzgerald informed Cubela that the
United States is prepared to render all
necessary assistance to any anti-
Communist Cuban group which
succeeds in neutralizing the present
Cuban leadership and assumes
sufficient control to invite the United
States to render the assistance it is
prepared to give. It was emphasized
that the above support will be
forthcoming only after a real coup
has been effected and the group
involved is in a position to request
U.S. (probably under OAS auspices) recogni-
tion and support."

11111920

90

"Those involved now recall the purpose
of the meeting as being something quite
different from that appearing in written
records prepared at about the time of the
meeting. Fitzgerald recalls that
Cubela spoke repeatedly of the need for
an assassin to SE (Fitzgerald)
wants no part of such a plan (Fitzgerald)

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90

Fitzgerald says he told Cubela that U.S. govt would have no part of an attempt on Castro's life.

(Sanchez) memo states that Cubela wanted to know what technical support we could provide him

91

⁰³
11/14/63 - (Wainwright) meets (Hepedine) in N.Y.C. (Wainwright) contact report reveals Cubela's reaction to meeting w/ Fitzgerald:

Cubela satisfies us far as policy concerned but not happy about not being given technical assistance for the operation. (Hepedine) said that Cubela dwelt constantly on this point."

11/19/63 - (Sanchez) memo for record:

Fitzgerald approved telling Cubela he would be given a cache inside Cuba - cache could

"include high powered rifle w/ scope
C/SAs requested written reports on
AMLAASH operation be kept to a minimum"

92

11/20/63 - following summary is

based on recollections of those involved
Cubela didn't want to sacrifice his life
for that of Castro - ergo the high powered rifle

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7
92

Gunn, Halpern, (Sanchez) settled
in use of Black Leaf 40, common insecticide
as poison that could be used to kill
CASTRO

93

Plan at action stage on 11/20 -
Halpern (Sanchez) contacted Gunn
when say ~~needed~~ a ball point pen hypo-
dermic that (Sanchez) would take up
him the following day. Gunn
then made it up & delivered it
to (Sanchez) & returned two proto-
types - as of 1967 still in Gunn's
safe - doesn't remember (Sanchez)
returning the device to him - he
believes he was told Cubela would not
accept the device

11/22/63

(Sanchez) in Paris - meets Cubela in the
afternoon

93a

(Sanchez) showed pen to Cubela & believes
he accepted it but said he would not
take it to Cuba. ~~He~~ Cubela not impres-
sioned w/ the device. Gunn (Sanchez) says it
was not loaded. Cubela was expected to
supply his own poison

11111922

(Sanchez's) contact party meeting does
not mention pen or poison

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96

3/7/64 - HQ cable that high powered
rifleman main item requested by
AMLAASH

3/13/64 JMWAVE can break rifle
down so must omit from the
cache

3/17-3/21/64 - 1 Amlash cache
explosion

4/24/64 - (Depedino) briefed to meet
Carlos Jorge Robreno Marquez
who has mpt message from Cuba

97

5/3/64 Cuba wants silence for
for Belgian FAH submarine
gun socket

5/5/64 TSP make the silence

6/9-6/11/64

2 ~~nd~~ Amlash cache put down
with the FAH automatic rifle
but silence not included

98

8/1/64 - ~~AMTRUNK~~ S/W message from
(AMTRUNK) re recovery of caches

8/30/64 Manuel Antune ~~associate~~
goes to France on 10/7/64 to
meet with dissident members of
Castro regime -

11111924

(Alberto BLANCO Romay)

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98

11/12/64

Cubela in Prague for meetings

99

11/13/64

- Artime reports that will talk to Amlesh if he is contact man for dissidents. Artime thinks if Amlesh is the chief dissident we can forget about the operation

11/25/64 Cubela in Paris

12/4/64 - (Sanchez) request money \$4500

~~to pay~~ for Artime for travel to meet w/ dissidents.

Artime did travel to Europe

and meet the dissidents

12/6-12/7/64 (Sanchez) & Cubela meet in Paris

100

Cubela wants to continue w/ his plans

Told that U.S. would not get involved in his plan. Cubela said if he needed help he would look elsewhere

12/10/64 - (Sanchez) memo indicates that Agency wants to put Artime & Cubela together w/out them knowing it had been engineered by CIA. But CIA didn't intend to furnish Artime assets w/plan to give Cubela

101

12/17/64

- Cubela & (AMTRUNK) ¹¹¹¹¹⁹²⁵ did not go to Cuba site personally - HQ cable to fishman used to recover ~~SECRET~~ file not 1000 101A 101B

4PV

15-4

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101

12/27/64 Arttime + Cubela meet in Madrid
for first time

102

12/30/64 - Cubela + Arttime meet
again in Madrid
Arttime reports meeting to
Sanchez in Fla. on 1/3/65
Cubela told Arttime he hadn't
been provided silence - If
Arttime could get Cubela silence
he would take it back to Cuba
If one could get another silenced
rifle, Arttime would cache it
in Cuba for Cubela

1/28/65 (Sanchez) ^{in Paris to meet} ~~Cubela~~ ~~report~~
Arttime

2/2/65 - (Sanchez) meets Cubela +
(Pepedans) - Cubela says
reached agreement w/ Arttime
Arttime to provide package in Mexico
Cubela to take back ~~to~~ in personal
luggage

11111926

103

2/11/65 -

16-7

2/12/65 Arttime reports from (Panama City
Station) on Arttime's final meeting w/ Cubela
Arttime delivered 3 packages to Cubela in
Madrid. Cubela satisfied

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3/4/65 -

15-2

103

3/15/65 - (Madrid sentin) cables that

Rafael Garcia-Banzo Durube in Madrid
from Cuba - (Intro'd to ¹⁵²Allen office)

104

claimed to be in contact w/ dissident
Cuban military leaders - he was referring
to Cubela - Garcia-Banzo ^{Gautier} had
defended Santos Trufficante who was kicked
out of Cuba

- name-link between Cubela & the
gambling-syndicate plot

6/65 - HQ decides to term all contacts
w/ key members of Cubela group

" It had become increasingly apparent
that the circle of Cubans who knew
of Cubela's plans and of CIA's
association w/ them was ever widen-

105

ing

Last straw - June '65 -

Victor Espinosa Hernandez tells
story to CIA about contact w/
Cubela friend in Paris who
relayed Cubela message for
CIA that in a position to kill
Castro & others but wanted
assurance of U.S. ¹¹¹¹⁹²⁷ government
support

From this story it
was obvious that Espinosa knew
the full details of the Cubela program

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106

CIA files don't indicate what kind of "help" Cubela wanted from the CIA!!

6/23/65 HQ cable to stations concerned re termination of contact w/members of the Cubela group.

107

Rent's reports Cuban security police arrested Cubela & Guin who conspired w/ CIA

3/7/65 - Cubela & Guin on trial

3/8/65 excerpts from trial

108

109

Castro sends letter to court suggesting

3/10/66

transcript

110

no death sentences for the accused
Cubela & Guin get 25 years

Q - when is the sentence

Cubela: I throw the sentence away because it was burning my hands

Discussion of Assass. at High-level govt meeting

11111928

111

Name of ~~Cubela~~ Cubela's dealings w/ CIA from 3/61 - 11/64 mentioned in the trial proceedings. 1st assoc of Cubela w/ CIA was in connection w/ trip to Europe late 64. Not even a hint of the Ball Point Pen. & Roscoe

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129 —

130 —

131 —

132

"Phase Two is associated ~~in~~ ^{with} Harvey's mind w/ the Executive Action Capability, which reportedly was developed in response to White House urgings."

133

"When Robert Kennedy was briefed on Phase One in May 1962, he strongly admonished Houston and Edwards to check w/ the Attorney General in advance of any future intended use of U.S. criminal elements. This was not done w/ respect to Phase Two, which was already well under way at the time Kennedy was briefed."

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111

ISOR speculate on reason for w/idea
evidence at trial

"Castro may have thought it politi-
cally imprudent to allow the specu-
lation of someone so close to his
inner circle, who had merely
plotted w/out acting. If the
full details of Cubella's involve-
ment w/ CIA had come out in
court, Castro might have had
little excuse for asking for leniency

112

2 high-level interagency meetings
at which aspects of CASTRO raised

- 1) meeting of S6(A)
- 2) held on 7/30/67 - 303 Committee
probably at White House Situation
Room

113

8/10/62

S6(A) meeting

Tom Parrott's minutes of the meeting
make no mention of the subject
of assassination.

The Comex Harvey recall McNamara
raised the subject - also Harvey
notes show it was mentioned
by Thurman

11111930

The Comex 4/14/67 memo recalls meeting
on 8/9 or 8/8 /62 meeting at JCS opera-
tions Room in Pentagon where
suggestion made that top people
including Castro, of Cuban
regime be liquidated

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ISOR says
the Comex recall
is probably faulty

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113

McCone took immediate exception to the discussion & after meeting told McNamara - & McNamara agreed. McCone says SICA never gave suggestion serious consideration.

114

McCone said that term such as "knock off Castro" & "dispose of Castro" were used but always construed to mean overthrow the Communist gov't in Cuba.

8/13 / memo from Sandale to Hawley, Robert Hurwicz at State, Gen. H. Hanes at Defense & Gen. W. Wilson at USAF. Memo assigned resp. for drafting paper on various subjects relate to Cuban operation.

Hawley's assignment had no portion deleted.

Hawley sent memo to DDP Helms on 8/14 saying cyclical portion said "including elimination of leaders". Hawley has protested use of phrase to Sandale's assistant. Frank Hand & Hawley said should be deleted from all copies.

115

"Hawley told us that Sandale repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassinating Castro w/ Hawley re the next several weeks." Hawley said he always avoided such discussions. Hawley believed that 5 people Sandale knew knew sensitive details of Project MONSOON. Sandale's interest in assass. as an aspect of it.

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115

7/36/67

303 committee meeting - Peter Jessing was secretary

116

reference in minutes to 6/10/64 memo info report from DDP to Director. Also to other "elite" including Special Asst to Pres. for Nat. Sec'y Affairs, A. & report related proposal for Castro assass model prominent Cuban exile. Mafu appeared to be involved - also Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch, Pres. of Bacardi Rum Int'l. Record shows CIA only involvement in plot was the report info on its existence

117

only other evd. of the discussion is a 8/17/64 memo from DCI (McCone) to Beards reporting results of FBI interview w/ alleged participants

118

The Drew Pearson Story

119

The Possible Complications of the Gambling Syndicate Operation

O'Connell wrote report submitted ^{directly} to DDP

120

1) Mafu did brief his atty, Edward P. Morgan on Mafu's participation in Phase I

2) Mafu didn't know of Phase II - never heard of it from Roselli

3) Mafu ~~was~~ suspects Roselli + Morgan have a relationship

121

List of who knows what

11111932

122

IGR points finger at Roselli as ultimate source of info on gambling syndicate plot and Morgan as Pearson's source

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122 —

123 —

124 —

125 —

126

"In learning of the Roselli-Morgan link, we are relieved of the need for speculation as to how the story had gotten out. It is quite likely that Roselli is the source, Morgan the channel and Anderson and Pearson the recipients, reason for leaking:

... "Roselli is drinking too much and talking and that Morgan is also drinking and talking to a newspaperman friend."

127

The Philippine National Bureau of Invest. has a Puerto Rican in custody who claim he participated in Castro-inspired assass. plot in Dallas. He also claim Castro made 7/6 2 speech threatening to assass. Kennedy in retaliation for 2 Kennedy attempts on Castro's life. "We have found no record nor recollection of Castro having made such a speech."

128

The Puerto Rican is probably going to be deported to U.S. —

"We may expect the FBI to take him over and wring him dry. We fear the likelihood that things will get worse before they begin to get better."

SECRET

1111933